We study comparative statics of Nth-degree risk increases, as de…ned by Ekern (1980) , within a large class of problems that involve bidimensional payo¤s and additive or multiplicative risks. We establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions for unambiguous impact of Nth-degree risk increases on optimal decision making. We develop a simple and intuitive approach to interpret these conditions : novel notions of directional Nthdegree risk aversion that are characterized via preferences over lotteries
Introduction
Consumers select how much to save, how much to invest in di¤erent assets, how long to work, and how much to spend on medical care under a great degree of uncertainty. Firms invest large amounts of money in risky endeavors. Policymakers allocate scarce resources to projects with highly uncertain returns (e.g. environmental and health care projects). A natural question that arises in these and other similar problems is the following: How does an increase in risk a¤ect the optimal level of exposure to the risk? In this paper we revisit this question within a large class of problems that involve 1) a bivariate utility function, 2) a linear constraint that links the two attributes that enter the decision-maker's utility, and 3) increases in Nth-degree risk as de…ned by Ekern (1980) .
A substantial amount of research has been devoted to analyze closely related problems. The general setting that we use is in the spirit of Dardanoni (1988) , who developed a unifying framework to analyze the impact of increases in risk à la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) in a large class of problems. More recently, a number of authors have analyzed the impact of a larger class of increases in risk -namely, Nth degree increases in risk as in Ekern (1980) -in di¤erent frameworks, including the classical problems of precautionary saving (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2008) , precautionary labor supply (Chiu and Eeckhoudt, 2010) , and portfolio choice (Chiu et al., 2011) 1 . The focus of the recent work and much of the earlier literature has been on …nding su¢ cient conditions for unambiguous comparative statics of changes in risk. Although this is an important endeavor, many important questions remain unanswered. Are these conditions also necessary?
If not, what are the necessary and su¢ cient conditions? What is the interpretation of these conditions, which frequently involve establishing the sign of two or more third, fourth, or higher-order partial derivatives of the payo¤ function? How are these conditions related to more primitive attitudes towards risk? Our objective is to answer these questions.
We begin the analysis in the next Section by revisiting Ekern's (1980) results. Following the methods of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) , Ekern (1980) characterized Nth-degree risk increases by the fact that they increase the expected value of any N times continuously di¤erentiable real valued function q such that ( 1) N q (N ) 0 where q (N ) is the N th derivative of q: We prove a dual result. The functions q for which the expected value is increased by any increase in Nth-degree risk are exactly those such that ( 1) N q (N ) 0. This general result is the main ingredient for characterizing necessary and su¢ cient conditions for unambiguous comparative statics of risk within our framework and also for the interpretation of these results.
In Section 3 we perform the comparative statics analysis within the mentioned framework and for two di¤erent scenarios, one in which the risk is additive and another one in which the risk is multiplicative in the decision variable. In each case, we provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an unambiguous impact of Nth degree risk increases and we compare our conditions with existing conditions in the literature. As an illustration, we show that no decision-maker that views the attributes as goods (i.e. with a positive marginal utility) will always increase the level of the decision variable when faced with a …rst-degree multiplicative-risk increase. Similarly, no decision-maker with diminishing marginal utility (i.e. risk averse) will always increase the level of the decision variable when faced with a Rothschild-Stiglitz multiplicative-risk increase. While these results are intuitive in the classical portfolio choice problem, we show that they hold much more generally within our framework and that they generalize to increases in Nth-degree risk.
Section 4 develops a simple and intuitive interpretation of the previously obtained conditions. Following along the lines of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) , Eeckhoudt et al (2007) , Eeckhoudt et al (2009) , and Chiu et al. (2011) , we propose concepts of additive and multiplicative directional Nth-degree risk aversion; these are characterized via preferences for harms disaggregation across outcomes of 50-50 bivariate lotteries. The harms we consider involve unidimensional increases in Nth-degree risk. These concepts of directional Nth-degree risk aversion include as special cases the concept of prudence analyzed by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) and the concept of cross-prudence analyzed by Eeckhoudt et al (2007) . For a …xed level of one of the attributes, the lotteries we study are isomorphic to a set of lotteries studied by Eeckhoudt et al (2009) special case of this framework in which the attributes are perfect substitutes, making it, in essence, a univariate problem. Chiu et al (2011) study a broader class of problems that involve multiplicative risks in a univariate setting.
in the case of additive risks and to the lotteries studied by Chiu et al (2011) in the case of multiplicative risks. In addition to extending their results to the bidimensional case, our contribution is to characterize the preference for harms disaggregation (i.e. to establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions). In particular, we characterize the situations where Nth degree changes in risk have an unambiguous impact on the optimal decision in terms of Nth-degree preference for harms disaggregation.
A Preliminary Result
Let us start by revisiting the notion of increases in risk proposed by Ekern (1980 
We say that e 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over e 1 ; and we denote it by 
In particular, this means that Ekern (1980) shows that if a function q is such that ( 1)
] for all pair (e 1 ; e 2 ) such that e 2 < N e 1 : The following Lemma extends this result by also showing the reverse implication. We characterize the set of N times continuously di¤erentiable functions for which E [q(e 2 )] E [q(e 1 )] for all pair (e 1 ; e 2 ) where e 2 is an increase in Nthdegree risk over e 1 and we show that these functions are exactly those such that
Lemma 2 Let q be a given real valued function that is N times continuously di¤ erentiable on R + . The following are equivalent.
2. For all x 0; we have ( 1) N q (N ) (x) 0:
As an illustration, for N = 2; we retrieve the classical result that a risk averse agent (i.e. an agent who dislikes mean preserving spreads) is an agent whose utility function is concave.
Lemma 2 will prove to be essential in Sections 3 and 4.
Optimal Decision and Increasing Risk
The problem that we analyze follows closely the setup in Dardanoni (1988) . The decision-maker has an increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely di¤eren-tiable two-dimensional utility function U (y; z) de…ned for y and z positive. As usual, we denote partial derivatives by subscripts. Uncertainty is described by a probability space ( ; F; P ) where describes the set of possible states of the world, F is the set of measurable events and P is a probability measure. The decision maker has the possibility to buy a quantity x of an asset that has a random payo¤~ 0 in terms of the second attribute at a (deterministic) cost p > 0 in terms of the …rst attribute. The initial endowment of the decision maker in terms of the …rst attribute is deterministic and denoted by K: The initial endowment in terms of the second attribute is random and denoted bỹ 0: Both random variables~ and~ are assumed to be bounded above. The decision-maker's problem P U;K;p (~ ;~ ) is then the following
The …rst-order necessary condition and the second-order su¢ cient condition for optimality, assuming an interior solution, are given by
with g (x; ; ) = pU y (K xp; x + ) + U z (K xp; x + ) and where g x (x; ; ) = p 2 U yy (K xp; x + ) 2p U yz (K xp; x + )+ 2 U zz (K xp; x + ) : By strict concavity of U; this last quantity is always negative. The …rst order condition is then necessary and su¢ cient.
In the next we will alternatively need the following Inada-type conditions: Assumption A1 The utility function U is such that lim z!0 Uz(y;z) Uy(y;z) = 1 and lim z!1 Uz(y;z) Uy(y;z) = 0. Assumption A2 The utility function U is such that z Uz(y;z) Uy(y;z) is unbounded. It is classical to assume that lim z!0 U z (y; z) = 1 and lim z!1 U z (y; z) = 0 which means that the second attribute is necessary for the agent's survival and that the agents approach satiation for large quantities of that attribute. Assumption A1 is a little bit stronger and limits the possibilities for substitutability between the two attributes. A low level of the second attribute increases the marginal utility for that attribute much faster than for the other one and satiation with respect to the second attribute does not mean satiation with respect to the …rst one. An example of utility functions satisfying our Inada-type condition is given by the set of homothetic utility functions that satisfy the classical Inada conditions in the direction of both attributes, i.e. lim z!0 U z (y; z) = 1, lim z!1 U z (y; z) = 0, lim y!0 U y (y; z) = 1 and lim y!1 U y (y; z) = 0. Clearly, with a separable utility function U of the form U (y; z) = u(y) + v(z);, Assumption A1 is also equivalent to the classical Inada condition on v. Assumption A2 means that U must satisfy either lim z!0 z Uz(y;z) Uy(y;z) = 1 (which is a stronger condition than the …rst condition in Assumption A1) or lim z!1 z Uz(y;z) Uy(y;z) = 1. With a separable utility function; the condition can be rewritten as zv 0 (z) is unbounded. This last condition is, in particular, satis…ed by all CRRA functions except the logarithmic utility function. When U is nonseparable, our assumption is, in particular, satis…ed when zU z (y; z) is unbounded and when U y (y; z) remains bounded for z near to 0 or near to 1 (or converges to 1 slower than U z (y; z)). Note that Assumption A2 is satis…ed when we embed the classical portfolio problem with one risk-free asset and one risky asset in our framework (setting U (y; z) = v(y + z) and rede…ning the variables).
The problem P U;K;p has found many important applications in the economics literature, including
The 2-date optimal saving model with either time-non-separable utility (e.g. Leland, 1968 , Sandmo, 1970 , Dreze and Modigliani, 1972 or timeseparable utility (e.g. Kimball, 1990 , Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2008 , Chiu et al., 2011 and uncertainty surrounding the rate-of-return on saving or the future income.
The optimal allocation of income to medical expenditures and consumption of non-medical goods when either the return on medical expenditures or the consumer's health status is uncertain (e.g. Dardanoni and Wagsta¤, 1990 ).
The trade-o¤ between leisure and consumption, with wage income or nonwage income risks (e.g. Block and Heineke, 1973 , Chiu and Eeckhoudt, 2010 .
The trade-o¤ between (dirty) production and environmental-quality, with uncertainty surrounding the damages that the productive activity generates or the level of environmental quality itself (e.g. Baiardi and Menegatti, 2011).
The private provision of public goods under uncertainty surrounding the contributions of others (Sandler et al., 1987 , Keenan et al., 2006 .
The leisure/production trade-o¤ of an entrepreneur facing price uncertainty in a competitive environment Stiglitz, 1971, Chiu et al., 2011) .
In some of the above cases, like in the 2-date optimal saving model, the asset is a classical …nancial asset. In other cases, the asset corresponds to the mechanism that transforms money into health (health care) or leisure into money (labor) or production into environmental quality, etc.
The objective in these articles has been the evaluation of how increases in risk a¤ect the optimal value of the choice variable. While the earlier literature focused exclusively on mean preserving spreads, a number of recent papers have evaluated more generally the e¤ect of increases in Nth-degree risk as de…ned by Ekern (1980) Chiu et al., 2011) . In the present paper, we will also focus on the more general case of N th-degree risk, considering separately the problem in which the endowment of the second attribute~ is random and the problem in which the asset's payo¤~ is random.
Uncertainty Over the Endowment
Suppose that e = is deterministic and remains unchanged while considering a change in the second attribute initial endowment from e 1 to e 2 , where e 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over e 1 : How does the increase in risk from e 1 to e 2 a¤ect the optimal level of the choice variable x? In order to provide some intuition, let us consider the classical 2-date precautionary saving problem with a separable utility function U of the form U (y; z) = u(y) + v(z): In such a setting, it is well known that an agent raises his optimal saving when adding a zero-mean risk (to a deterministic second period initial endowment) if and only if his marginal utility of future consumption is convex, v 000 0 (see e.g. Gollier, 2001). In our more general setting where U is not separable and where the initial endowment e 1 is not necessarily deterministic, the analysis should lead us to introduce conditions that involve cross derivatives as well as the cost p of the second attribute in terms of the …rst attribute in order to re ‡ect the trade-o¤ between these two attributes. The following proposition provides a characterization of the utility functions for which any increase in Nth-degree risk increases the optimal level of the choice variable.
Proposition 3 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely differentiable utility function satisfying Assumption A1. Let us consider p and as given. The following properties are equivalent:
1. For all initial endowment (K; e 1 ); any increase in Nth-degree risk over the second attribute initial endowment from e 1 to e 2 increases the optimal level of the choice variable, i.e. x 2 x 1 where x 1 and x 2 respectively denote the solutions of P U;K;p (e 1 ; ) and P U;K;p (e 2 ; ) and where e 2 < N e 1 .
2. For all (y; z) ; we have ( 1)
Therefore, for example, for e 1 = k 1 2 R + , if e 2 is an increase in …rst-degree risk over e 1 of the form e 2 = k 2 , for a positive constant k 2 < k 1 , and if U yz 0 then x 2 x 1 (remark that, by concavity of U; U zz is nonpositive). Similarly, for e 1 = k 1 2 R + , if e 2 is an increase in second-degree risk over e 1 of the form e 2 = k 1 + e ", where e " is a mean zero random variable, and if U yzz 0 and U zzz 0 then x 2 x 1 . As a third example, if e 1 is a lottery with equiprobable outcome k and 2k + e " (where k is a positive constant and e " is a mean zero random variable), if e 2 is also a lottery with equiprobable outcomes 2k and k + e ", and if U yzzz 0 and U zzzz 0 then x 2 x 1 .
If the problem under consideration corresponds to the classical 2-date precautionary saving problem with endowment risk and with a separable utility function U of the form U (y; z) = u(y) + v(z), we obtain that x 1 x 2 for all pair (e 1 ; e 2 ) such that e 1 4 N e 2 if and only if ( 1)
The "if" part of this result has been established by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) . We emphasize that our condition
0 is necessary and su¢ cient. 
Uncertainty Over the Asset' s payo¤
Suppose now that e = is deterministic and remains unchanged while considering a change from e 1 to e 2 , where e 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over e 1 . The following Proposition establishes the analog of Proposition 3 for an increase in risk of this multiplicative variable.
Proposition 4 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely differentiable utility function satisfying Assumption A2. The following properties are equivalent:
1. For all initial endowment (K; ) and all asset's cost and payo¤ (p; e 1 ) such that the solution x 1 of P U;K;p ( ; e 1 ) is nonnegative, any increase in Nthdegree risk over the asset's payo¤ from e 1 to e 2 increases the optimal level of the choice variable, i.e. x 2 x 1 where x 1 0 and x 2 respectively denote the solutions of P U;K;p ( ; e 1 ) and P U;K;p ( ; e 2 ) and where e 2 < N e 1 .
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 4 appear to be similar to a number of results established previously in the context of di¤erent applications of our model 3 . There is, however, a crucial di¤erence. Consider again the 2-date saving problem with separable utility, but now with rate-ofreturn risk. This problem was analyzed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) in the context of increases in 2nd-degree risk and more recently by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) for more general increases in risk. In both papers, the authors show that when future labor income is zero (in our setting = 0, so z = x ) the consumer will save more in response to an increase in 2nd-degree risk if zv (3) (z) + 2v (2) (z) 0. According to our proposition, this condition is indeed necessary and, as our proof makes it clear, it is also su¢ cient if = 0. But Proposition 4 also shows that the assumption of zero labor income does not come without loss of generality. Once we consider the more general case, another necessary condition for an increase in savings is v (2) (z) 0. In other words, any risk-averse consumer (v (2) (z) < 0) will decrease savings in response to higher risk for some initial endowment levels. In essence, Proposition 4 corresponds to Rothschild and Stiglitz'(1971, p. 72) conclusion that "no risk averse investor will always increase his holdings of risky assets when their variability increases." Proposition 4 implies that this important result holds much more generally in the context of problem P U;K;p ( ;~ ) and generalizes the conclusion by stating that no agent for which ( 1) N @ N U @z N (y; z) < 0 will always increase the demand for the asset in problem P U;K;p ( ;~ ) when facing an increase in Nth-degree risk.
As another illustration, consider the static labor supply problem analyzed by Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) . In this context y represents leisure, the choice variable x is labor supply, represents wage income, and represents non-wage income. Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) show that the conditions ( 1)
an increase in Nth-degree risk in wage income to increase the supply of labor. 4 Note that the second condition does not correspond to our second condition in Proposition 4. Indeed, the derivatives are not taken at the same point and the two conditions coincide only for = 0: In fact, if we divide by
@z N (y; x + ) the condition introduced by Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) we obtain a condition on the concept of proportional N-th degree relative risk aversion 5 . Instead, our condition relies on the concept of N-th degree relative risk aversion, which is more natural and easier to interpret. Our Proposition implies, in particular, that imposing the Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) condition on the proportional N-th degree relative risk aversion for all is equivalent to imposing a condition on the usual concept of N-th degree relative risk aversion as well as imposing
This means that Proposition 2 of Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) cannot be applied in order to characterize the situations where the supply of labor is increased in response to a risk increase at all initial endowment levels . Indeed, the authors assume that ( 1)
@z N (y; z) 0, which is not consistent with the necessary condition ( 1)
0. This implies, for instance, that a mean preserving spread in wage income cannot always increase the supply of labor for a consumer with diminishing marginal utility of 4 Similar conditions, but in di¤erent contexts, have been derived by Baiardi and Menegatti (2010) and by Chiu et al. (2011) . 5 We recall that the concept of proportional relative risk aversion is de…ned to be z Uzz (y;z+ ) Uz (y;z+ ) and the concept of N-th degree relative risk aversion is de…ned to be
consumption. These results then suggest that, when considering a risk increase on the asset's payo¤, it may be more natural to analyze the conditions under which the agent decreases his level of exposure to the asset's risk. While Proposition 4 characterized the situations where any increase in risk on the asset's payo¤ implies an increase in the choice variable, the following Proposition characterizes the situations where any increase in risk on the asset's payo¤ implies a decrease in the choice variable.
Proposition 5 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely differentiable utility function satisfying Assumption A2. The following properties are equivalent:
1. For all initial endowment (K; ) and all asset's cost and payo¤ (p; e 1 )
such that the solution x 1 of P U;K;p ( ; e 1 ) is nonnegative, any increase in Nth-degree risk over the asset's payo¤ from e 1 to e 2 decreases the optimal level of the choice variable, i.e. x 1 x 2 where x 1 0 and x 2 respectively denote the solutions of P U;K;p ( ; e 1 ) and P U;K;p ( ; e 2 ).
For example, if we consider the 2-date optimal saving problem with rate-ofreturn risk, we obtain that any increase in N-th degree risk leads to a decrease of the optimal saving (i.e. x 2 x 1 for all e 1 4 N e 2 ) if and only if, for all z;
0, which corresponds to the conditions established by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008) in a model without labor income ( = 0). 6 Again, we remark that our conditions are necessary and jointly su¢ cient and that they hold for all (y; z). Still in a one dimensional setting, we retrieve the following well-known results in the context of the classical portfolio choice problem (see e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1971 , Hadar and Seo, 1990 , Gollier, 2001 , p. 61):
A risk averse agent decreases his optimal demand for the risky asset at all wealth levels and when facing an increase in 1st-degree risk in the asset's payo¤ if the degree of relative risk aversion is positive and no greater than one, 0 < z
A risk averse agent decreases his optimal demand for the risky asset at all wealth levels and when facing an increase in 2nd-degree risk in the asset's payo¤ if the degree of relative prudence is positive and no greater than two, 0 < z
6 Suppose, for example, that relative risk aversion is constant: v(z) = (1 ) 1 z 1 : Then, if < 1 an Nth-degree risk increase in the rate-of-return will decrease savings. For > 1; an Nth-degree risk increase in the rate-of-return will increase savings for some wealth levels and it will decrease savings for other wealth levels.
More generally, a direct implication of our results is that an agent will decrease his portfolio exposure to the risky asset whenever he faces an increase in Nth-degree risk in the asset's payo¤ and his utility function satis…es 0 z
In summary, Propositions 3, 4, and 5 establish precisely the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for unambiguous comparative statics of changes in risk in a large class of problems. Our next objective is to develop a simple and intuitive approach to interpret these conditions.
Lottery Choices and Optimal Exposure to Risk
In this section we show that the optimal response to changes in risk can be characterized via preferences over particular classes of lottery pairs. We …rst consider the case of additive risks and then evaluate the case of multiplicative risks.
Additive Risks
Consider two attributes with nonnegative initial quantities y and z, and imagine a lottery in which with a 50 percent chance risk e 1 is added to z and with a 50 percent chance risk e 2 is added to z, where e 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over e 1 : Denote this lottery by [(y; z + e 1 ) ; (y; z + e 2 )]. Now consider the following location experiment: the consumer is told that she must accept the bundle x 1 y ; x 1 z in tandem with one of the lottery outcomes of her choice and the bundle x 2 y ; x 2 z in tandem with the other lottery outcome where x 1 ; x 2 ; y ; z are constants and x 2 > x 1 ; to which outcome will she a¤ect each bundle?
The answer to the preceding question clearly depends not only on the consumer's preferences but also on the magnitude and the direction of y ; z .
Let us …rst consider 1st-degree and 2nd-degree increases in risk. In particular, let (e 1 ; e 2 ) = (k; 0) with k > 0, for a 1st-degree increase in risk and (e 1 ; e 2 ) = (k; k + e "), where e " is a mean zero random variable bounded below by k, for a 2nd-degree increase in risk. We propose the following de…nitions.
De…nition 6 Let us consider a consumer endowed with preferences over the space of bivariate 50-50 lotteries denoted by :
1. We say that preferences display risk aversion in the direction of y ; z if, for any (y; z; x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 R 4 + with x 2 > x 1 , the consumer prefers to a¤ ect the bundle x 1 y ; x 1 z to the highest outcome y + x 2 y ; z + x 2 z ; y + x 1 y ; z + x 1 z + k y + x 1 y ; z + x 1 z ; y + x 2 y ; z + x 2 z + k :
2. We say that preferences display prudence (or downside risk aversion) in the direction of y ; z if, for any (y;
) as 'mutually aggravating,'so she prefers to disaggregate the "harms" across outcomes of the lotteries (notice that we are referring to x 1 y ; x 1 z as a 'harm' relative to x 2 y ; x 2 z ).
In essence, the same intuition holds for our more general de…nitions. When both y and z are positive, our de…nitions intuitively correspond to the standard notions of risk aversion and prudence, in the sense that a consumer who views risks as mutually aggravating would prefer to add the "bad" bundle x 1 y ; x 1 z to the less risky outcome of the lottery. If, on the other hand, y and z have opposite signs, we would expect a consumer who views risks as mutually aggravating to evaluate the relative strength of two e¤ects, one that aggravates the existing risk and the other one that mitigates it. Our bivariate de…nitions of directional risk aversion and of directional prudence cover all of these di¤erent cases.
In an expected utility framework, when preferences are represented by a bivariate utility function U (y; z) on R + R + , they display risk aversion in the direction of y ; z if
The preferences display prudence in the direction of y ; z if
We obtain the following result Proposition 7 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely differentiable utility function on R 2 + . The preferences represented by U display risk aversion in the direction of y ; z if and only if y U yz + z U zz < 0 for all (y; z) 2 R 2 + . Preferences display prudence in the direction of y ; z if and only if y U yzz + z U zzz > 0 for all y and z.
There are, in fact, two e¤ects that determine the consumer's bivariate preference for 'harm disaggregation'. The condition for risk aversion in the direction of y ; z can be decomposed into 1) a 'risk aversion in z'e¤ect, captured by the term z U zz , and 2) a 'correlation aversion' e¤ect, captured by the term y U yz . Similarly, the condition for prudence in the direction of y ; z can be decomposed into 1) a 'prudence in z'e¤ect, captured by the term z U zzz , and 2) a 'cross-prudence'e¤ect, captured by the term y U yzz .
These results can be quite easily generalized to the case of increases in Nthdegree risk. To do so, let us introduce the following de…nition.
De…nition 8
We say that preferences display Nth-degree risk aversion in the direction of y ; z if, for all (y; z; x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 R 4 + such that x 2 > x 1 and for all pair of random variables (e 1 ; e 2 ) such that e 2 is an increase in Nth-degree risk over e 1 ; we have y + x 2 y ; z + x 2 z + e 2 ; y + x 1 y ; z + x 1 z + e 1 y + x 1 y ; z + x 1 z + e 2 ; y + x 2 y ; z + x 2 z + e 1 :
Again, this lottery ordering captures a preference to 'disaggregate harms' across lottery outcomes, where the harms are represented by an Nth-degree risk increase (e 2 < N e 1 ) and by a shift from x 2 to x 1 < x 2 in the direction of y ; z . The following proposition establishes precisely what this lottery preference means in an expected utility framework.
Proposition 9 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely differentiable utility function on R 8 The contribution 8 
@z N +M (y; z) 0. When y = 0 and z > 0, and for a …xed value of y, our Proposition deals with the special case in which M = 1. of our proposition is twofold. First, and most obvious, our bivariate notion of directional Nth-degree risk aversion is more encompassing. Second, by making use of Lemma 2, the proposition characterizes a unique set of expected utility maximizers that display Nth-degree risk aversion in the direction of y ; z . This is important because, without the "only if" part of the proposition, we would not be able to establish a direct link between lottery choices and optimal exposure to risk, as we do in the following corollary.
Corollary 10 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave, in…nitely di¤ erentiable utility function on R 1. For all initial endowment (K; e 1 ); any increase in Nth-degree risk over the second attribute initial endowment increases the optimal level of the choice variable, i.e. x 2 x 1 where x 1 and x 2 respectively denote the solutions of P U;K;p (e 1 ; ) and P U;K;p (e 2 ; ) and where e 2 < N e 1 .
The preferences represented by U display Nth-degree risk aversion in the direction of ( p; ).
This result is quite intuitive. It establishes that, in response to an increase in risk, the consumer's optimal level of the choice variable (e.g. the level of savings, of labor supply, of medical care) will re ‡ect her preferences towards 'harms disaggregation'as de…ned in this paper. Consider, for instance, the case of a mean preserving spread and, to be concrete, the problem of precautionary saving with time-non-separable utility. As explained above, two e¤ects operate. First, a consumer that is prudent (in second period consumption) would like to allocate a higher level of savings to second period consumption to mitigate the increase in risk. Second, a higher level of savings implies a lower level of …rst period consumption, which a cross-prudent consumer dislikes to match with the higher risk. As a result, the higher level of risk implies a higher level of savings if the prudence e¤ect is stronger than the cross-prudence e¤ect, i.e. pU yzz + U zzz > 0, or, equivalently, if the consumer is prudent in the direction of ( p; ). Similarly, consider a decrease in second period income with certainty (e 2 is then a …rst degree increase in risk over e 1 ). A consumer that is risk averse (in second period consumption) would like to mitigate this harm by increasing savings. Doing so, however, implies that the harm will be present when …rst period consumption is lower, which a correlation averse individual dislikes. As a result, this harm will increase savings if the risk aversion e¤ect is stronger than the correlation aversion e¤ect, i.e. pU yz + U zz < 0, or, equivalently, if the consumer is risk averse in the direction of ( p; ).
Clearly, a similar intuition holds for all of the above-mentioned applications and for increases in risk of any degree. A decision-maker that views risks as mutually aggravating would like to compensate the higher risk in attribute z with a higher level of the choice variable. Alternatively, he could compensate the higher risk by reducing the level of the choice variable and, as a result, by increasing the level of the other attribute. Whether the level of the choice variable increases or decreases in response to an increase in risk then depends on the relative strengths of two opposing forces, one that aggravates the higher risk and the other one that ameliorates it. Our contribution in this section has been to establish the equivalence between such a trade-o¤ and the choice of simple bivariate lotteries.
Multiplicative Risks
As before, consider the following experiment: the consumer needs to locate x 1 y ; x 1 z and x 2 y ; x 2 z to each of the two (random) outcomes of the lottery (y; z + e 1 ) and (y; z + e 2 ) where x 2 > x 1 0 and where e 2 0 is an Nth degree risk increase over e 1 0. Now, however, the e¤ect of x 1 z and x 2 z is to scale the risks e 1 and e 2 : In particular, the consumer evaluates the following lotteries:
We propose the following de…nitions.
De…nition 11
We say that preferences display Nth-degree multiplicative-risk attraction (resp aversion) in the direction of y ; z if, for all (y; z; x 1 ; x 2 ) such that x 2 > x 1 0 and for all pair of random variables (e 1 ; e 2 ) such that e 2 is an increase in Nth degree risk over e 1 ; we have
To understand the di¤erent forces at play in such preference ordering, consider …rst the case with y = 0 and a …xed value of y analyzed by Chiu et al. (2011) . On the one hand, since x 2 > x 1 , the higher risk in L 1 is scaled up, which hurts a consumer that dislikes higher risks. On the other hand, x 2 > x 1 also implies that the distribution of z + x 2 z e 2 is shifted upwards relative to z+x 1 z e 1 : As in the previous section, this implies that an individual that prefers to disaggregate harms would like to match this higher level of z with the higher risk, making L 1 relatively more attractive than L 2 . Therefore, as stated by Chiu et al. (2011) , the choice of L 1 over L 2 will depend on the relative strengths of these two opposing e¤ects. If we now allow y to di¤er from zero we have, as in the previous section, another e¤ect that arises from the consumer's preference to match the higher risk with a higher level of the other attribute (y). If y > 0 this additional e¤ect will make L 1 more desirable than L 2 for an individual that prefers to disaggregate harms, while the opposite will be true if y < 0. In the next, we will focus on the case y 0 and this tends to make L 2 more desirable than L 1 for an individual that prefers to disaggregate harms. 9 It is in reference to this situation that we choose to call Nth-degree risk aversion the fact that L 2 is preferred to L 1 and to call Nth-degree risk-attraction the opposite behavior. 9 The case with y 0 and z 0 is the relevant scenario to interpret the conditions found in Section 3.
The following Proposition establishes precisely the di¤erent forces at play in an expected utility model and for general increases in Nth-degree risk.
Proposition 12 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely differentiable utility function on R 2 + and let y 0 and z 0 be given. The preferences represented by U display Nth-degree multiplicative-risk attraction (resp. aversion) in the direction of y ; z if and only if ( 1)
Note that the characterizations do not depend on y ; z but only on their signs since we assumed y 0 and z 0: In the next we will say that the preferences represented by U display Nth-degree multiplicative-risk aversion (attraction) in the direction of R R + in order to say that they display Nth-degree multiplicative-risk aversion (attraction) in the direction of some y ; z 2 R R + or equivalently in the direction of all y ; z 2 R R + : We have then the following immediate corollaries.
Corollary 13 Let U be a given increasing, strictly concave and in…nitely differentiable utility function satisfying Assumption A2. The following properties are equivalent:
1. For all initial endowment (K; ) and all asset's cost and payo¤ (p; e 1 ) such that the solution x 1 of P U;K;p ( ; e 1 ) is nonnegative, an increase in Nth-degree risk over the asset's payo¤ , from e 1 to e 2 , increases (resp. decreases) the optimal level of the choice variable, i.e. x 2 x 1 (resp. x 1 x 2 ), where x 1 0 and x 2 0 respectively denote the solutions of P U;K;p ( ; e 1 ) and P U;K;p ( ; e 2 ).
2. The preferences represented by U display Nth-degree multiplicative-risk attraction (resp. aversion) in the direction of R R + :
In other words, an individual will always decrease the demand for the asset in problem P U;K;p ( ; e ) when the asset's payo¤ is subject to an increase in Nth-degree risk if and only if he or she always selects lottery L 2 over lottery L 1 10 . Such a choice re ‡ects, in turn, the decision-maker's attitudes towards disaggregation of harms across bidimensional lottery outcomes as well as the decision-maker's attitudes towards increases in risk. Similarly, an individual will always increase the demand for the asset in problem P U;K;p ( ; e ) when the asset's payo¤ is subject to an increase in Nth-degree risk if and only if he or she always selects lottery L 1 over lottery L 2 . However, as it is clear from Proposition 12, no individual that displays mixed risk aversion in z, ( 1) N @ N U @z N (y; z) 0, can also display Nth-degree multiplicative-risk attraction in the direction of R R + , so no such individual will always prefer lottery L 1 over lottery L 2 , or equivalently, no such individual will always increase the demand for the asset in problem P U;K;p ( ; e ). Remark. As mentioned above, Chiu et al. (2011) analyzed the univariate case with y = 0 and y …xed. They conclude that (Theorem 2): (using our notation) if ( 1)
As it is clear from the proof of Proposition 12, the second part of this statement is equivalent to our results when y = 0. We remark that the "only if" part follows from our Lemma 2, which to our knowledge has not been proven before. Furthermore, our proof also clari…es that the assumption ( 1)
In fact, as stated in Proposition 12, the condition ( 1)
@z N (y; z) 0 is necessary for an individual to always prefer L 1 over L 2 in an expected utility framework.
Concluding Remarks
Given the ubiquitous presence of uncertainty in most economic decisions, it is not surprising that a large amount of research has been devoted towards understanding the economic consequences of changes in risk. This paper contributes towards that goal in two important ways. First, we establish the minimum set of necessary and su¢ cient conditions for unambiguous comparative statics of changes in risk in the large class of problems involving bidimensional consequences. Second, we link these conditions with more primitive attitudes towards risk in the form of preferences over simple lottery pairs. In particular, we show that making unambiguous statements about the ordering of a particular class of lottery pairs is equivalent to making unambiguous statements regarding the optimal response to changes in risk in the problems under consideration.
Two interesting and related topics for future research are 1) establishing measures of the intensity of preferences towards higher-order risks in a multidimensional setting and 2) evaluating comparative statics of risk when the risk is multidimensional.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. The fact that 2. implies 1. results directly from Ekern (1980) . For the sake of completeness we rederive it. Let (e 1 ; e 2 ) be such that
By de…nition, all the terms in the sum are equal to 0 and F q(x)dF e 2 (x)
By de…nition, we have F N q (N ) (x) > 0 for all x such that q (N ) (x) 6 = 0 which completes the proof. Proof of Proposition 3 Let us prove that 2. implies 1. Let (e 1 ; e 2 ) be such that e 2 < N e 1 and let q( ) = g(x 1 ; ; ): 0: By concavity of U; it is easy to check that E [g(x; e 2 ; )] is a decreasing function of x: Since x 2 is characterized by E [g(x 2 ; e 2 ; )] = 0; we obtain that x 2 x 1 : Proof. Let us prove 1. implies 2. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we consider e 1 and e 2 two nonnegative random variables with a common upper bound B such that e 2 < N e 1 : As above, we introduce the random variables e 1;" = " B e 1 + and e 2;" = " B e 2 + for some > 0 and some " > 0: The random variables e 1;" and e 2;" take their values in [ ; + "] and e 2;" < N e 1;" : Let us now consider ( 0 ; F 0 ; P 0 ) a copy of ( ; F; P ): We consider the probability
Let us consider a given random variable e on ( 0 ; F 0 ; P 0 ) and let us de…ne the random variables e i;" ; i = 1; 2; on [ 0 by e i;" (!) = e i;" (!)1 !2 + e (!)1 !2 0 : Since we have to deal with di¤erent probabilities, we will specify the probability under which the distribution function is determined by a subscript, for instance F e ;P denotes the distribution function of e under P: It is easy to check that F e i;" ;Q" = "F e i;" ;P + (1 ")F e ;P 0 and we have then e 2;" < N e 1;" : Let x 1;" and x 2;" be respectively the solutions of P U;K;p (e 1;" ; ) and P U;K;P (e 2;" ; ) where the expectations are taken with respect to Q " : By 1., we have x 2;" x 1;" : By de…nition, we have E Q" g(x 1;" ; e 1;" ; ) = 0 and E Q" g(x 2;" ; e 2;" ; ) = 0: By concavity of U; g is a decreasing function of x and we have E Q" g(x 1;" ; e 2 ; ) 0: Let q be de…ned by q( ) = g(x 1;" ; ; ): We have
By construction, the left side of the equality is nonnegative, all the terms in the sum are equal to zero and F
[N ] e 2;P (t) F
[N ] e 1;P (t) is nonnegative and nonzero. Therefore, ( 1) N q (N ) (t) is nonnegative at least on a given subinterval of [ ; + "] :
We have then
(10) where x 1;" satis…es E Q" pU y K x 1;" p; x 1;" + e 1;" + U z K x 1;" p; x 1;" + e 1;" = 0
Remark that, until now, ; K and e have been arbitrarily chosen. Let us now choose them carefully in order to derive our result. Let (Y; Z) be arbitrary in We choose x > 0 such that x < inf(Z; z ) and and K are taken such that = Z x > 0 and K = Y + px : Let be given by = z x > 0 and let e be a random variable on 0 that is equal to ; P 0 a.s. We have
The solution of Equation (11) for " = 0 is then given by x : In a well chosen neighborhood of x , x 7 ! K xp and x 7 ! x + " B e 1 + are bounded and bounded away from 0. The functions U y and U z being continuously di¤eren-tiable, the function (x; ") 7 ! "E P h g(x;
" B e 1 + ; )
is then di¤erentiable with respect to x at (x ; 0): Furthermore, the derivative of this last function with respect to x at (x ; 0) is nonzero (concavity of U ). The solution x 1;" of Equation (11) is then continuous with respect to " in a neighborhood of 0 which gives lim "!0 x 1;" = x : Furthermore, we clearly have lim "!0 " = : Taking the limit in Equation (10) when " tends to 0; we obtain
or, by construction
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us prove that 2. implies 1. Let (e 1 ; e 2 ) be such that e 2 < N e 1 and let q( ) = g(x 1 ; ; ): ; ; e 2 )] 0: By concavity of U; it is easy to check that g(x; ; ) is a decreasing function of x: From there we derive that x 2 x 1 : Proof. Let us prove that 1. implies 2. As in the proof of Lemma 2 and Proposition 3, we consider e 1 and e 2 two nonnegative random variables with a common upper bound B such that e 2 < N e 1 : As above, we introduce the random variables e 1;" = " B e 1 + and e 2;" = " B e 2 + for some > 0 and some " > 0: The random variables e 1;" and e 2;" take their values in [ ; + "] and e 2;" < N e 1;" : Let us consider ( 0 ; F 0 ; P 0 ) a copy of ( ; F; P ) : We consider the probability space (
Let us consider a given random variable e on ( 0 ; F 0 ; P 0 ) and let us de…ne the random variables e i;" ; i = 1; 2; on [ 0 by e i;" (!) = e i;" (!)1 !2 + e (!)1 !2 0 : As previously, we have F e i;" ;Q" = "F e i;" ;P + (1 ")F e ;P 0 and e 2;" < N e 1;" : Let x 1;" and x 2;" be respectively the solutions of P U;K;p ( ; e 1;" ) and P U;K;p ( ; e 2;" ) where the expectations are taken with respect to Q " : If x 1;" is nonnegative then, by 1., we have x 2;" x 1;" : By de…nition, we have E Q" g(x 1;" ; ; e 1;" ) = 0 and E Q" g(x 2;" ; ; e 2;" ) = 0: By concavity of U; g is a decreasing function of x and we have E Q" g(x 1;" ; ; e 2;" ) 0: Let q be de…ned by q( ) = g(x 1;" ; ; ):
We have
e 2 ;P ( + ") F
[k] By construction, the left side of the equality is nonnegative, all the terms in the sum are equal to zero and F
[N ]
e 1 ;P (t) is nonnegative and nonzero. Therefore, ( 1) N q (N ) is nonnegative at least on a given subinterval of [ ; + "] :
where
pU y K x 1;" p; x 1;" e 1;" + + e 1;" U z K x 1;" p; x 1;" e 1;" + = 0
Remark that, until now p; ; K; and e have been arbitrarily chosen. Let us now choose them carefully in order to derive our result. We assume …rst that e is equal to 1 on 0 ; P 0 a.s. Let x > 0 be given and let (M; Y; Z) in ( The solution of Equation (15) for " = 0 is then given by x : In a well chosen neighborhood of x , x 7 ! K xp and x 7 ! x + " B e 1 + are bounded and bounded away from 0. The functions U y and U z being continuously di¤er-entiable, the function (x; ") 7 ! "E P h g(x; ;
" B e 1 + )
is then di¤erentiable with respect to x at (x ; 0): Furthermore, the derivative with respect to x at (x ; 0) is nonzero. The solution x 1;" of Equation (15) is then continuous with respect to " in a neighborhood of 0 which gives lim "!0 x 1;" = x and guarantees that x 1;" > 0 for " small enough: Since we clearly have lim "!0 " = ; taking the limit in Equation (12) when " tends to 0; we obtain We assumed that z Proof of Proposition 9. In an expected utility framework, Nth-degree risk aversion in the direction of y ; z is equivalent to 2 + and for t 2 T (y) where h ( ; y; z; t) = y U y y + t y ; z + t z + z U z y + t y ; z + t z . By Lemma 2, this last inequality is satis…ed for every pair (e 1 ; e 2 ) such that e 2 is an increase in Nthdegree risk over e 1 if and only if 
which gives that our necessary and su¢ cient condition is satis…ed.
A far as Nth-degree multiplicative-risk aversion is concerned, it is characterized by the fact that E U y + t y ; z + t z e 2 E U y + t y ; z + t z e 1 is decreasing on T (y) = t 2 R + : y + t y 0 or, equivalently, by the fact that E [ h (e 2 ; y; z; t)] is larger than E [ h (~ 1 ; y; z; t)] for all (y; z) 2 R 0: The rest of the proof is then directly adapted from the multiplicative-risk attraction setting.
